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Harun Badakhshi

The fascist group „Afghan Mellat “

A history of lies and distortion of the far right extremist *Afghan* ethnonationalism

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The fascist group „Afghan Mellat“

A history of lies, distortion and violence of the far right extremist *Afghan* ethnonationalism in Afghanistan and in Europe

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ABSTRACT

The story of an overtly fascist group “Afghan Mellat” started with a Hollywood ready acting, weirdly calling itself the “social democrat party” (افغان ټولنپال ولسواک, افغان ټولنپال ولسواکیز ګوند ګوند), has been an astonishing story of lies, distortion, deformation and defiance. This marvellous story must be told, because of its ridiculousness and because of its dangerousness against the people. The fact of lying, distortion, and a willingness to use violence is in itself not a rare political-manipulative phenomenon, but the fact that a small and influential group of extremist *Afghan* ethnonationalists, managed to occupy the entire spectrum of political, military, and administrative power in Afghanistan—internally overt true fascists who branded and introduced themselves to foreign countries and audiences as "social democrats"—is a rare phenomenon. The founding leader, Gholam Mohammad Farhad غلام محمد فرهاد, who went to Hitler-Germany to the fascist ideologist in-chief Alfred Rosenberg’s “Außenpolitisches Amt” in 1938 to be “educated” in fine nuances of German fascism and transfer fascist knowledge to his native country. The fascist group with Rosenberg-educated leader has been faking being social democrat was successful; the social democrat party supports, allegedly and “blindly”, Aghan Mellat till today. The current leader, Anwar Ahadi انورالحق احدي, a different typus of a “smart technocrat” almost apolitical, manages merely the big money of “Afghan Fund” for the most violent *Afghan* ethnonationalist militia of Taleban. This is a story that to be told too.

Key words:

Fascist group, Afghan or Pushtun ethnonationalism, Afghan or Pushtun fascism, politics of lies and distortion, Afghan Milat (melat, mellat, millat, milat), Hollywood-ready, fake news

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Doing something *unusual* but legitim in the social sciences, asking the omnipresent World Wide Web might seem, methodologically, *unusual*, be it so: “provide an extensive and detailed report on "Afghan Mellat Party"[1]. The answer: “The Afghan Mellat Party (Afghan Social Democratic Party - ASDP) is one of Afghanistan's oldest and most prominent **ethno-nationalist** political parties, established in March 1966. It has historically advocated for a "Greater Afghanistan" (Pashtunistan), promoting **Pashtun** cultural and political **dominance** within the country's multi-ethnic landscape.”[2] So far, this sound as an explanation to a fascist group formulating ethnic ***Afghan*** hegemony. The search revealed also: “Ideology: Afghan[3] Mellat combined “*social democracy”* with fierce Pashtun nationalism. It strongly emphasized the Pashtu language and **Pashtun interests**[4], often leading to its perception as an ethno-nationalist group rather than a national party.”[5]

The inquiry was repeated in multiple scientific databases. Issues related to the foundation, extremist Pushtun nationalism[6], fascist ideology, media, revealed more differentiating and detailed answers about activities of the last 70 years of the existence this fascist group acting,

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[1] This questioning was performed. The result might depend of time and location, but it is resolutely identical in all standard internet search platforms.

[2] Google Chrome, revealed on 14 April 2026.

[3] The term *Afghan* افغان has always been merely an exogenic ethnonym for Pushtuns پشتون. I will use the term implicitly. The Pushtuns (also Pokhtun, Patan, Pashtun etc.) called themselves intrinsically differently. The language of this ethnic minority has been called Pushtu (also Pokhto, Pashtu etc.). Analogy: German has been an exogenic ethnonym for the inhabitants of deutsche Länder, and Germany for those lands. As they call themselves Deutsch and the country Deutschland. There in all European country different ethnonyms and country names for Germany. The complexity of the naming / branding issues and all related implications has been studies well, e.g. Badakhshi, H, (2024) Who Can Be Called An “Afghan”. A Research Article. JTBI, TBI Academic Press. Online: https://archive.org/details/badakhshi-who-can-be-called-an-afghan-april-2024 . Badakhshi, H (2024) The Birth Of The Country “ Afghanistan”. JTBI, TBI Academic Press. Online: https://archive.org/details/badakhshi-the-birth-of-the-country-afghanistan. Last access 23 April 2026

[4] Ruttig, Th (2012) Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006). Online: https://web.archive.org/web/20090327080958/http://www.acsf.af/English/articles/KAS%20pol%20parties%20paper.pdf (Last access 5 April 2026). Page 2

[5] ibid

[6] Rubin, B (1995) Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University Press. Page 82 contains a note on Afghan Mellat’s ideological stance.

Hollywood-ready as a “social democrat” party. The fascist group, emulating a “*social democrat*” party, was founded on 8 March of 1966. The founding meeting took place in Kabul[7]. I asked few relevant members of the group in Germany about this historical obscurity in the historiography of this fascist[8] group, no responds. There is merely one single website of the group[9]. The website reports the foundational event as follows: “year 1966, 8 March at “Maiwand Wat” street in “Khadem Mina” district of Kabul”[10] under the leadership of Gholam Mohammad Farhad. Persons who participated in the foundational event were: “Engineer Ghulam Mohammad Farhad, Qiam Khadem, Faqir Bakhtiari, Mohammad Rasul Pashtun, Mohammad Amin Wakman, Abdullah Khan Wardak, Hussein Ghul Zazai, Feda Mohammad fedai, Hafiz Ullah Abdulrahimzai, Said Mehdi Agha, General Fateh Mohammad Hazara, Mohammad Safdar Salarzai, Abdul Wahab Momand, Atiq Oskhidad”[11] In this event a group

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[7] Emadi, H (2001), The politics of the disspossed. Praeger London. Page 28. Online: https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9780313015489_A23617712/preview-9780313015489_A23617712.pdf and Ruttig, Th (2012) Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006). Online: https://web.archive.org/web/20090327080958/http://www.acsf.af/English/articles/KAS%20pol%20parties%20paper.pdf (Last access 5 April 2026). Multiple Wikipedia sites.

[8] The scientific definition of fascism is complex, as it is a historical phenomenon with various manifestations. There is broad consensus in research that fascism is an ultranationalist, authoritarian, and anti-democratic political ideology based on "palingenetic" myths (national rebirth). According to Roger Griffin, the core of fascism is the belief in a necessary "rebirth" of the nation after a period of perceived decline. This is a revolutionary form of nationalism that aims to completely restructure society. Fascism rejects liberal democracy, pluralism, and Marxist class struggle, but strives for a new "third way" order. Thinking is hierarchical and elitist. A charismatic leader claims to embody the true will of the people and stands above parliamentary rules. A sense of "us" is created, based on the demarcation from "others" (minorities, foreigners, political dissidents). These are blamed as internal or external enemies for the decline (scapegoating mechanism). Fascist practice glorifies physical violence, militarization, and paramilitary structures, often without prior intellectual reflection. Some definitions her, R. **Griffin** provides a definition of fascism as "palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism," which aims at the rebirth of the nation (The Nature of Fascism, 1991). R. **Paxton** defines fascism as "a form of political behaviour characterized by an obsessive preoccupation with the decline of the community, humiliation, or victimhood" (Anatomy of Fascism, 2004). **Umberto Eco** writes in his essay "Ur-Fascism" (1995) about 14 typical characteristics, including "obsession with conspiracy," contempt for the weak, and the "cult of tradition." S.G. **Payne** provides one of the most comprehensive typologies, encompassing fascist negations (anti-liberal, anti-Marxist), aims (nationalist state), and stylistic devices (violence, cult of personality) (Fascism: Comparison and Definition, 1980). Wolfgang Wippermann reflected on historical-genetic theory of fascism in Germany. Fascist range of actions include repression of the opposition, control of the mass media, and suppression of dissenting opinions. The attempt to control all areas of life (school, work, leisure) through the party and the state. Use of myths, symbols, and "Newspeak" (impoverishment of language) to suppress critical thinking. In summary, fascism can be described as a radical, extremist form of extreme ethno-nationalism that understands violence as a purifying process and subordinates the individual to the "organic community."

[9] Afghan Mellat website 1. Online. https://web.archive.org/web/20061205030808/http://afghanmellat.org/ last access 14.4.2026

[10] The correspondent sub site: https://web.archive.org/web/20070512213349/http://www.afghanmellat.org/afghan_mellat_history/afghan_mellat_history_page2.htm last access 14.4.2026

[11] The correspondent sub site: https://web.archive.org/web/20070512213349/http://www.afghanmellat.org/afghan_mellat_history/afghan_mellat_history_page2.htm last access 14.4.2026

newspaper with the title “Afghan Mellat“ was founded too, so the report on the site. As an editor in chief was Ahmad Ali Melatyar elected.

Political Stance and Activities

“Afghan Mellat combined social democracy with fierce Pashtun nationalism. The party’s credo held that "socialism without democracy and democracy without socialism are a farce". It strongly emphasized the ethnic Pashtu language and ethnic Pashtun interests, leading to its perception as an ethno-nationalist group rather than a national party. Ralph Magnus described the stance of this group as follows: “…khalq was the party of hard-core Pushtuns, much more useful in appealing the Pakistan’s leftist led by Kahn Wali Khan. They could not have been unaware of rival networks, especially in the military, of the extreme Pushtun nationalists of *Afghan* Millat… a number of military mutinies … were actions of *Afghan* Millat officers rather than Islamists.”[12] And more precisely formulated by Ruttig: “A core tenet of the party was its support for "Greater Afghanistan," a classical trope of chauvinist groups, advocating for the inclusion of Pashtun-inhabited tribal areas[13] on the other side of the Durand Line in Pakistan. Historically, the party was known for its ultranationalist stance. Gilles Dorronsoro wrote 2005 on Afghan Mellat[14] history, though to this time in the Pushtunist government of Hamed Karsai: “The Pushtun nationalists gravitated towards Jamiyat Afghan Democrat…or the Afghan Mellat… The latter party, established on 8 March 1966, took an ultranationalist political line on the question of Pushtunistan and Pushtu language.” [15]

The group functioned both as a nationalist political organization[16], “far right ultra-nationalist political group”[17] and as a cultural association, allowing it some protection from government

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[12] Ralph H. Magnus, Eden Naby (2002) Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid. Westview

[13] Ruttig, Th (2012) Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006). Online: https://web.archive.org/web/20090327080958/http://www.acsf.af/English/articles/KAS%20pol%20parties%20paper.pdf (Last access 5 April 2026)

[14] Dorronsoro, G (2005) Afghanistan: Revolution Unending, 1979–2002. Hurst Publishers.

[15] Ibid, explicit notes on Afghan Mellat on page 71.

[16] ibid. A note on Afghan Mellat on page 72.

[17] Anthony Arnold (1983) Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism. Stanford University Press. Page 94. Frau-right ultra nationalist is clearly the most adequate political definition of a fascist group.

persecution during the early, turbulent years. The website of “Afghan Mellat”, published some years ago the program[18]. The program section shows two version, one in Persian and one in Pushtu. The Persian version contains a two-page introduction of the group leader Ahadi, as “President of the Afghan Social Democratic Party” [19] The text confirms the date of the foundation on 8 March 1966 (17 Hut 1344). It is reported that the first program of the group was published in 1973 (1352 Kh) and that the first large scale meeting took place on 27 July 1995 (5 Asad 1374 Kh).

The program confirms all implications of an *Afghan* suprematist group, thus to all definitions a fascist group: “The state of Afghanistan is an Afghan state that was founded by Ahamad Shah Baba.” Since we know that the term “state”[20] bears well defined meaning in sociology, law, political sciences and in each encyclopaedia. The tradition of lying, distortion, deformation and defiance and pre-emptive historical falsification demonstrated by *Afghan* (They call themselves Pushtun) ethnonationalists is enormous. The state within the current borders and with all juridical and political characteristics of a state was completed on 13 May of 1896[21], under the absolutist rule of Abdul Rahman Mohammadzai Barekzai, though still named “The Dominion of Kabul”. The program clearly confirms all implications of a suprematist Afghan-ethnic group, thus all definitions a fascist group: The group recognize only “the Pushtu language as the national language.” "Ethnic supremacy", as in the case of Afghan

[18] Online version of the program: https://web.archive.org/web/20070811212603/http://www.afghanmellat.org/moramnama/moramnama_dari/afghan_mellat_aim_dari_main_page1.htm (Last access 5 April 2026)

[19] Corresponding to https://web.archive.org/web/20070817055419/http://www.afghanmellat.org/moramnama/moramnama_dari/afghan_mellat_aim_dari_main_page2.htm (Last access 9 April 2026)

[20] **Encyclopaedia Britannica**: Defines the state as a political organization of society, or the body politic, or, more narrowly, the institutions of government. It is characterized as a human association distinguished by its purpose (order/security), methods (law enforcement), defined territory, and sovereignty. **Encyclopedia.com** (Social Sciences & Law): Defines the state as an independent (and sovereign) political community, derived from the Roman-law concept of status rei Romanae. It notes that in the 15th century, this replaced terms like polis or res publica**. The Canadian Encyclopedia**: Defines the state as a broad concept including government as the seat of legitimate authority in a territory, along with bureaucracy, judiciary, armed forces, police, and ideological apparatuses (such as education).

[21] Badakhshi, H (2024) The Birth Afghanistan. A tale of violence of the unholy alliance against the free om. V2, Nr 2, JTBI. By TBI Academic Press. Online: https://archive.org/details/badakhshi-the-birth-of-the-country-afghanistan, last access 1. April 2026)

Mellat clearly demonstrated, is scientifically defined in sociology and political science as “the ideology, belief system, or structural arrangement that asserts one's own ethnic group is inherently superior to others and, consequently, entitled to dominate or hold privileged status in society. Unlike interpersonal racism, scientific approaches analyse ethnic supremacy as a structural phenomenon (systemic racism) that structures social relations, laws, and institutions to favour a dominant group. *Afghan* ethnic supremacy, as in the case of Afghan Mellat clearly demonstrated, is a subjective belief system that ranks human groups into hierarchies, often based on false perceptions of cultural, descent-based, or biological superiority. In political science, this often translates to *Afghan* **ethnocracy**—a regime where the state is utilized to promote the interests, identity, and power of one ethnic group over others. It is characterized by qualified rights to citizenship or systemic inequality. It involves the totalizing dominance of a particular group, often secured by the "consent" of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, where the dominant ethnic group's cultural traits are accepted as the "normal" standard. It is supported by in-group favouritism, that was the standard approach for the last 130 years under the rule of *Afghan* ethnocracy over all other non-Afghan ethnicities, where members of the dominant group feel entitlement and perceive other groups as threats to their status. The advantages of the Afghan ethnocracy in the last 130 years have been evident: Institutionalization of privilege in economic, legal, and educational systems (e.g., land ownership policies, language restrictions), that led to political "will to power" to enforce this dominance. In the case of Afghan Mellat is obvious that their hegemonic dominance often attempts to make their structural and solid privilege invisible to those who have it, portraying it as "normal" rather than structural. For further studies one might rad more[22].

Ethnic Supremacy vs. nationalism have been lately discussed in the inner circles of *Afghan* ethnonationalists in the West. Nationalism is, in the West at least, at its core, patriotism, but it can evolve into *ethnic nationalism* (seeking a state solely for one ethnic

[22] Butenschøn, N. A. (1993). Ethnocracy. This work defines the concept of an ethnocratic regime, where the state privileges one ethnic group. Bonilla-Silva, E. (2010). Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Discusses how structural supremacy persists through systems rather than individual prejudices. Mills, C. W. (1997). The Racial Contract. Analyzes how a systemic, often hidden, agreement among a dominant group maintains their supremacy. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. Provides the foundational concept of "primordial attachments" (ethnicity based on blood, speech, custom) that underpin ethnic superiority claims. De Vries, R. E. (2002). Ethnic Tension in Paradise: Explaining Ethnic Supremacy Aspirations in Fiji. Defines ethnic supremacy as political "will to power" and provides frameworks for measuring it.

group) or *supremacism* (believing that group is superior to others). This is exactly what happened in the first period of manifestation of *Afghan* despotism and promoting nationalism[23]. I have shown that process of conversion in multiple articles. All articles published in the Journal of "Taher Badakhshi Institute" are freely available[24]. And often and unavailingly, the ethnic supremacy is a specific type of racism that focuses on ethnic, cultural, or descent-based identity to claim dominance, whereas racism often includes biological/racial claims, as one can see in Afghan (thus Pushtun) case. Ethnonationalism is defined as a form of nationalism wherein the nation is defined in terms of shared ethnicity, ancestry, culture, language, or religion, rather than by citizenship or political allegiance to a state. It is the ideology that a specific ethnic group ("the nation") should have its own state and that this state should serve the exclusive interests of that group.

Ethnonationalism (ethnic nationalism) posits that membership in the nation is inherited through ancestry and bloodlines (*jus sanguinis*), not granted by birth on a territory or through citizenship. It is highly exclusive, often establishing a barrier for entry, where outsiders—even those who have lived in a country for decades—may never be fully accepted as members of the national community. Ant it is important and relevant to repeat, unlike civic nationalism, which defines the nation by shared political values and citizenship (e.g., USA, France), ethnonationalism defines the nation by pre-political cultural traits. What *Afghan* ethnonationalism is not for sure, is Patriotism. The program of Afghan Mellat confirms also with following statements its *Afghan* ethnic supremacy remains the core ideologic stream. "The *Afghan* social democrat party refuse the federal System and supports a united and central administration. This party supports the formation of a **national community[25]**, and a national community emerges only when all individuals of the country despite differences of

[23] Rubin, B (1995) Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University Press. Page 115 contains a note on Afghan Mellat's ideological stance.

[24] The Journal of "Taher Badakhshi Institute" for further in-depth and serious studies. https://archive.org/search?query=creator%3A%22PD+Dr.+med.+habil.+Harun+Badakhshi+%D8%AF%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1+%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86+%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%AE%D8%B4%DB%8C%22 Last access 15 April 2026

[25] See next chapters, it is scientifically shown that right wing extremist ethnonationalists "occupy" leftist symbolism, wording and metaphors. The word **national community** is a cross-content issue in this context.

language, ethnicity, religion and region understand themselves as member of a large *Afghan* society and are loyal to it. This party emphases the principle of *Afghan* identity of the state and national community in Afghanistan."[26] I discuss the notion of "**national community**" that seems to be a strong theoretical pillar of Afghan Mellat program, later in the next chapter. Some statements sound extremist ethnocratic globally are dangerous and populistic. The program states: "The party beliefs after the rule of God in the rule of national rule "Of course, national means always the *Afghans*, who call themselves **Pushtuns,** have got the sceptre in the hand. More than 90% of the program are platitudes and copy/paste paragraphs without any political differentiation or scientific precision. Seem by a sociologic lens, the program seems truly simple and simplistic without a trace of real data or information or consideration of implication of scientific knowledge. Anything written on economy in this program, is overtly demonstrating that Mr. Ahadi and his colleagues have hardly insight modern scientific knowledge, economic research, economic data or statistical information, generally about economy and implications of economic structures in the country. But, not surprisingly, when it comes to **Afghan** cultural **hegemony** over all other ethnicities, Mr Ahadi activates its Afghan ethnocratic malignancy and simplism. In the corresponding part to languages, the malignant spirits awake again. It states again: "The Afghan social democrat party recognize only Pushtu as the national language. Though Pushtu is the language of majority of the Afghanistan's people and previous governments recognized it as the national language and official language, it was not the case. The party confirms the expansion of the Pushtu language and will do anything for that end. This party gibe the right to any individual to get any position with the state with the precondition that the individual is capable to talk in both languages Pushtu and Dari. In this relation we condemn all failed efforts of previous governments."[27] The program clearly shows again all implications of a suprematist *Afghan*-ethnic group, thus to all definitions a fascist group: The fascist group sets preconditions for individuals, that means it

[26] Corresponding text:
https://web.archive.org/web/20070830030638/http://afghanmellat.org/moramnama/moramnama_dari/afghan_mellat_aim_dari_main_page5.htm last access 13.4.2026

[27] Corresponding text.
https://web.archive.org/web/20070831135225/http://afghanmellat.org/moramnama/moramnama_dari/afghan_mellat_aim_dari_main_page21.htm last access 14.4.2026

will set sanctions against those who do not speak Pushtu (Afghani) language. Afghan ethnic supremacy is converting in the very real context of this program a specific type of racism that focuses on ethnic identity to claim dominance of the *Afghans*.

The program contains 24 pages of mostly platitudes and generalities, infantile reductionist statement and the attentive reader see that, in the most relevant and appellative statements the core of the **Afghan ethnic supremacy** and **cultural hegemony.**

In the era of US presence, the Beirut Boys have been re-imported from the US to Afghanistan. Afghan Mellat revived and became a registered legal political party.

Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi, a prominent academic and politician, became a key figure, later serving in various high-level ministerial positions in the post-2001 government (including Finance and Commerce). In 2016, Ahadi formed a so-called "New National Front of Afghanistan" which was a coalition of several ethnonationalist *Afghan* supremacist individuals. It has traditionally been the strongest proponent of a "Greater Afghanistan" among the domestic political spectrum. After August 2021, Afghan Mellat's local subgroups unite with the *Afghan* supremacist militia of Taleban. The leader left the country to manage, allegedly, the money issues for his tribal relations for the sake of programmatic *Afghan* supremacy.

METHODS OF RESEARCH

The main and only scientific question asked in this very context, has been the following: to what extent and with what degree of ideological intensity the group “Afghan Mellat” bears symptoms of fascism, contains clear-cut “Afghan supremacy”, thus a destructive, aggressive, oppressive and dehumanizing way of policy? The group exists six decades, and all historical evidence is in favour of its core fascistic, “Afghan chauvinistic” and a destructive, aggressive “Afghan supremacy”. Why we discuss this question? The group “Afghan Mellat” is performing well coordinated with the “Afghan” militia of Taleban a series of meetings and gatherings for the end of levelling the introduction of the extremist group of Taleban in the West after 5 years. The author is observing these meetings and its reach and its audience. So, the origin of the question is a practical political reason and not merely another academic niche issues.

A comprehensive and **systematic search** in English, German also in Persian and Pushtu was conducted in multiple data bases, academic archives, newspapers, general archives, specialized and general libraries and individual website and social media appearances of the activists of this fascist group in order to evaluate by the **group’s own websites, publications, individual expressions, meetings and actions and reactions** with the focus on expressions of fascist ideology, and “Afghan chauvinistic” and a destructive, aggressive “Afghan supremacy”. We do **not** consult anti-fascist activists, leftist theory, intrinsic and extrinsic left-wing media, liberals, democrats or other publications and individuals who stand firmly based on the principles of the German Grundgesetz. There was no attempt to interview group’s activists or leaders. The reason for that wisely chosen ignorance was **group’s violent habitus, discriminatory attitudes and violent principles**.

There has been a wide and solid consensus that there is no need to repeat and reproduce scientific efforts already executed and realized in the past with a high degree of methodological firmness and rational thus logical clarity. The scientific journal of the “Taher Badakhshi Institute” published already a series of related research topics and scientific

problematique in the last two years[28]. A single issues, discussed widely, repetitively and senselessly is the naming of **Afghans** as Pushtuns (Pattans, Pashtuns etc.). Afghan is the exogenic ethnonym for Pushtuns. This science. Anything else ideology, lying, distortion, deformation and defiance and lack of basic literacy. There has been one article[29] in which the issues have been researched, discussed and finalized: Afghan is the exogenic ethnonym for Pushtuns. Anyone in Afghanistan who whishes' to be called as an Afghan has got the right, as well any individual wo does not wish to be called as an Afghan, also has got the same democratic right. This is fundamentally democratic statement and finalized.

On related issues and problematique of **Afghan** ethnonationalism, there have also been written some evidence-based, logically driven scientific articles of the Taher Badakhshi Institute that are in need to be cited and reproduced redundantly. Any scholar might read them and evaluate the scientific quality, though it is to state that all "evidence"[30] in these article stem from the **state's own publication** and therefore not negotiable and disputable for academia's sake of redundant disputes.

[28] Academia database and "Internet Archives" database, online:
https://www.academia.edu/121026199/What_Afghan_Ethnonationalism_caused_in_20th_Century_Part_Two

https://www.academia.edu/123489397/What_is_Afghan_Despotism_The_case_of_Hashem_Khan#

https://independent.academia.edu/PDDrHarunBadakhshi

https://archive.org/details/@pd_dr_harun_badakhshi

https://archive.org/details/badakhshi-who-can-be-called-an-afghan-april-2024

Last access 15.4.2026

[29] Badakhshi, H (2024). Who Can Be Called An " Afghan". A Research Article. Journal of the Taher Badakhshi Institute, by TBI Academic Press. Online version: https://archive.org/details/badakhshi-who-can-be-called-an-afghan-april-2024 last access 16. April 2026

[30] All scholarly papers available for free here: https://archive.org/details/@pd_dr_harun_badakhshi last access 15 April 2026.

RESULTS

THE AFGHAN MELLAT FOUNDER'S M. G. FARHAD EDUCATION IN FASCISM IN NAZI GERMANY

Gholam Mohammad Farhad (1901–1984, also Ghulam wit **U**) was a tribal *Afghan,* trained as engineer who, while studying in München / Germany (1921–1928), encountered Nazi ideology and was fascinated by aspects of National Socialism. Not by chance, because München was the epicentre of German fascist movement during 1920s. He studied, engineering at the Technical University of Munich, where he was exposed to fascist hence so-called "National Socialist" ideas. He was reportedly fascinated by certain aspects of Nazi politics. He was not actively involved in Nazi politics but rather transferred the ideology of the "Herrenrasse" to extremist *Afghan* ethnonationalism. He founded a fascistic *Afghan*[31] ethnonationalist group that overtook the name of its newspaper, Afghan Mellat. It became known for its ethno-nationalist Pushtun policies and was sometimes described as ethno-fascist. As the founder and first chairman of the Afghan Mellat Party (Afghan Social Democratic Party), he shaped the party's direction, driven by the ideology of Pushtunism[32], focused on *Afghan* ethnonationalism and the creation of a "Greater Afghanistan", often compared by critics to Nazi ideology. The website of the Afghan Mellat writes the following about its

[31] *Afghan (in cursive)* for the Pushtuns. Afghan: exogenic ethnonym for Pushtuns, who call themselves so, hence their endogenic ethnonym.

[32] The ideology of Pushtunism has been defined previously by Dr. Harun Badakhshi. Pushtunism has been the driving ideology of the ruling Mosaheban family (1929-1978), an *Afghan* clan named Mohammadzai, of the Barakzai tribe. Pushtunism propagated the "supremacy of Pushtun ruler", hence the Mosaheban family, over all peoples of Afghanistan. It explains the supremacy as a "natural right", and of a "natural Pushtun superiority" in a multiethnic country, where Pushtuns are a minority among others. The ideology of Pushtunism juristically guaranteed and morally legitimized for the Mosaheban family the absolute and unlimited political power in the realms of economy, military, police, education, media and administrations leadership. And it juristically guaranteed and morally legitimized the "Pushtun privilege" for all non-royal Pushtuns, specially for Pushtun tribal leaders and Pushtun affluent urban class. The ideology of Pushtunism juristically guaranteed and morally legitimized the "natural right" of "privileged Pushtun individuals" to occupy, vast majority of all available top positions in military, police, ministries, embassies, banks, intelligence, city halls, local provincial positions in state administration with evident economic privileges and, in education system. The ideology of Pushtunism survived the end of Mosaheban rule on 27 April 1978, well and enhanced. It survived in an enhanced format in the structures and individuals of the so-called "communist ruler" after 1978, evidently all them Pushtuns, as they were Pushtun Noor Mohammad Taraki (April 1978 till 14 September 1979), Pushtun Hafizullah Amin (14 September 1979 till 27 December 1979), Pushtun Babrak Karmal (27 December 1979 till 4 May 1986) and Pushtun Najib (4 May 1986 till 16 April 1992). Since 26 September 1996 with Pushtun Talban 1.0, who terminated the only exception from the "standard of Pushtun ruler" namely the only non-Pushtun ruler Rabani, till the invasion of the US army and the change on 13 November 2001, and again the standard with Pushtun Hamed Karasai (22 December 2001 till 29 September 2014) and, Pushtun Asharf Ghani (29 September 2014 till 15 August 2021), and again since 15 August 2021 with Pushtun Taleban 2.0 till today, 25 April 2027.

Exactly in this transition phase, in terms of a nations-building action, the absolutist regent Hashem Khan

founder, that he was a Pushtun from Maidan. “Engineer Ghulam Mohammad Farhad was educated at Habibia High School and was in the first group of students sent by King Amanullah Khan to Germany in 1921 for further education. He Studied Electrical Engineering at the Technishe (sic) University of Munich. He returned to Afghanistan in 1928.”[33] According to the web site two visits to Germany: 1934 to Hitler’s Nazi Germany and again 1947 Germany after the war, which sounds implausible and wired.

His visit in 1938, following the order of the country regent Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai, to the “Hohe Schule” of “Außenpolitisches Amt” of Alfred Rosenberg[34], the elite school for fascistic education and Nazi propaganda has not been mentioned. The reason remains unclear. Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai visited himself Hitler Nazi Germany 1936, stayed more than 4 months, met Adolf Hitler[35] in Berlin, learnt a lot of functioning dictatorship and selected individuals for the purpose of education. Farhad war his first selection after his both nephews Dauod and Naim for Fascist Germany experiences. I have showed this fact in a scientific article in the Journal of Taher Badakhshi Institute in 2024[36].

“Farhad Sahib was elected as Mayor of Kabul; he worked from 1948 to 1954 as Mayor of Kabul…He ended his tenure as Mayor in 1954 but continued as President of the Electric

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[33] Group website https://web.archive.org/web/20061216171615/http://www.afghanmellat.org/farhad_page.htm last access 2.4.2026.

[34] Das politische Tagebuch von Alfred Rosenberg 1934-1944. Bundesarchiv, Online https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/main.xhtml Last acess 24.4.2026. Thomas Marschner: Außenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP (Bestand NS 43) (Findbücher zu Beständen des Bundesarchivs Bd. 73), Koblenz 1999. Inventar archivalischer Quellen des NS-Staates, hrsg. von Heinz Boberach, München 1991/1995, Teil 1, S. 468 f. https://homepages.uni-tuebingen.de/gerd.simon/ChrHS.pdf. Außenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP, Bestand NS 43. Aussenpolitisches Amt der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, Online https://portal.ehri-project.eu/authorities/ehri_cb-770.
Aufzeichnungen, Hentig, Werner Otto, Korr'n , Aufzeichnungen 1934-1957. Nachlässe https://portal.ehri-project.eu/units/de-002624-nl-ed_113-nl_0_16_1-ed_113_2. Last access 15.4.2026. Außenpolitisches Amt. Staatliche und parteiamtliche Akten bis 1945. Deutsches Reich (bis 1945) . NSDAP und angeschlossene Verbände Reichsleitung, Außenpolitisches Amt. Rosenberg, Staatliche und parteiamtliche Akten bis 1945, Deutsches Reich (bis 1945), NSDAP und angeschlossene Verbände , Reichsleitung, Kanzlei Rosenberg.

[35] Badakhshi, H (2024) What Is Afghan Despotism The Case Of Hashem Khan . JTBI V2, No 5. Online: https://archive.org/details/badakhshi-what-is-afghan-despotism-the-case-of-hashem-khan-1 Last access 15.4.2026 .

[36] ibid

Company until 1966. Engineer Ghulam Mohammad Farhad was the member of Loya Jigra (The Great Council) that adopted the new Constitution in 1964. On March 8, 1966, he found the Afghan Mellat Party (Afghan Social Democratic Party). He was the founder and the first president of the party. He was also the first Publisher of Afghan Mellat Newspaper from April 1966 to May 1967. In 1968, he became the member of parliament (Kabul 6th District). He was Anti-communist. He resigned from Parliament in 1970. He was arrested by the communist regime on October 14, 1979, and accused of being the leader of a plot against the Khalqi regime the freed in early 1980. He died in Kabul, 1984 (15, Aqrab 1363)."[37]

Thomas Ruttigwrote in his report "Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006)", for the "Konrad Adenauer Stiftung" the following: "In 1948, Farhad was the first elected mayor of Kabul. From 1934, he had studied in Nazi Germany and was fascinated by some aspects of its policy…"[38] Obviously is the information about his study times in Germany is wrong. Farhad studied in München 1921-1928. Seen by historian's lens, Ruttig's statement is not correct. Consecutively, some reports on this issue, quoting the wrong information of Ruttig, "The founder of Afghan Mellat was the former Mayor of Kabul, Ghulam Mohammad Farhad. Farhad had previously studied in Nazi Germany and was fascinated by aspects of Nazi policy. (Ruttig) The Afghan Mellat Party favours the Pashtunization of Afghanistan and supports the concept of Greater Afghanistan. The Afghan Mellat party was accused by its critics of being *fascist.*" The report takeover the mistake of Ruttig.

The ideological genealogy of "Afghan Mellat" [39] has been studied. Evidently, the foundation of the "Awaken Youth" or ویش زلمیان Wheesh Zalmeyan. The Afghanistan expert Thomas Ruttig published an article on 26 Apr 2020 on the issues on AAN network website[40]

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[37] Afghan Mellat website. Online: https://web.archive.org/web/20061216171615/http://www.afghanmellat.org/farhad_page.htm Last access 14.4.2026

[38] Ruttig, Th (2012) Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006). With references to "Abdulhamid Mubarez, Tahlil-e waqe'at.e siasi-ye Afghanistan 1919-1996, Kabul, 1996". Online: https://web.archive.org/web/20090327080958/http://www.acsf.af/English/articles/KAS%20pol%20parties%20paper.pdf (Last access 5 April 2026)

[39] In Ralph H. Magnus, Eden Naby (2002): „…significant among these were Afghan Millat…which advocates Pushtun stand, thus alienating Pakistan by raising the Pushtunistan issues." Page 152.

[40] Thomas Ruttig. Flash from the Past: The 1950 Kabul Students Union and its impact on the post-WWII opposition movement. Citing his own diploma thesis at Humboldt University Berlin, titled "Zur Bedeutung der bürgerlichen Oppositionsbewegung der 50er Jahre unseres Jahrhunderts für die Formierung progressiver politischer Kräfte in Afghanistan" (On Afghanistan's

He writes: “The way for the pro-democracy movement had been opened in May 1946 when Shah Mahmud had replaced his autocratic half-brother Muhammad Hashem as prime minister. (Hashem died from illness in 1947.) Both were members of the royal family that held all key executive posts, and uncles of King Muhammad Zaher (ruled 1933-73)… This movement became more formal over spring and summer of 1947. But the impulse came from outside, in the form of attempts by Klup-e Melli (National Club) – a political circle set up by Daud[41] and Zabuli in the month of Jaddi 1325 (December 1946/January 1947) and allegedly financed by the latter – to persuade the opposition intellectuals to join. Government officials and members of parliament were encouraged to join this group… As Marvin Weinbaum wrote in 1972, it “found embarrassingly few recruits.” Zabuli reacted by dismissing a few opposition figures from their jobs in the Bank-e Melli empire, as Ghobar described in a 5 November 1951 article for Watan. Majruh and Ulfat, together with Abdul Rauf Benawa (1913-87), director of the Pashto Tolena, decided to set up an organisation of their own instead. A group of around 40 core activists, mostly Pashtuns, met on 24 Assad (15 August 1947) and founded the “Wheesh Zalmeyan/Jawanan-e Bedar” (the Awakened Youth). One of the activists taking part in the movement, Mir Muhammad Seddiq Farhang, however, wrote in his memoirs (Khaterat, published posthumously in Kabul, in 2015) that the talks between the Wheesh Zalmeyan and most non-Pashtun intellectuals to join the Wheesh Zalmeyan failed. According to him, they found the Pashtun intellectuals insensitive about the other ethnic groups’ grievance vis-à-vis the Pashtun domination of the state. Farhang also wrote that an attempt of the non-Pashtuns

1950s civic opposition movement and its impact on the formation of progressive political forces). AAN website. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/context-culture/flash-from-the-past-the-1950-kabul-students-union-and-its-impact-on-the-post-wwii-opposition-movement/ (Last access 12 April 2026)

[41] Mohammad Daud of Mohammadzai Clan of Afghan Barekzai-tribe, son of Aziz Mohammadzai Barekzai, grand sun of Yusuf Mohammadzai Barekzai, named officially „Sardar“, was a descendent of „Sardar of Peshawar“ (Persian / Urdu پشاور) Sultan Talai, who “lost/sold” his dominion to the Sikhs on May 6, 1834 (The Sikhs ruled directly until 1849, when the city was taken by the East India Company. For four generations on a lost mission and without land, the uncles of Daud rebelled in 1029 against Amanullah of Saraj clan of Afghan Barekzai-tribe (1919-1929). At that time Daud was still in France, where he went in 1921 with his father. Daud came back to Kabul, graduated in “3 months” from the Military School in Kabul and the royal “prime minister” and his uncle Hashem named him, due to “blood line”, a Brigadier General. with 22 years. After spending some years in tribal areas Mashreqi and Qandahar, he returned again to Kabul and in 1939, Khan was promoted, by Hashem the absolutist regent and still his uncle, to” Commander of the Central Forces”, till 1946. As the royal defence minister between 1946 and 1948 he started his political efforts and an immense portion of this format of polity was against the newly establishes state Pakistan. The reason was the definitive and irreversible loss of his original land in Hindostan (India), now becoming Pakistan. Klup-e Melli started as an incubator of the paradox Afghan ethnonationalism.

(Ghobar, Mahmudi, him and two others), immediately after these events, to set up their own united party, parallel to the Wesh Zalmian, failed as it was reported to the court and they decided to lie low for a while. “Again, a lot of factual mistake and wrongness. “Hashem died from illness in 1947”, is again incorrect. Hashem, the real regent and grand senior of ruling the Mosaheban family, kept ruling, well alive. As he got sick in summer 1958, meaning 11 years later that Ruttig beliefs, he gave up and selected last minute his favourite nephew Daoud to be the next autocratic regent on 7 September 1953[42].

Daoud Khan served as Prime Minister for a decade, from September 7, 1953, until March 10, 1963. Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai died on 26 October 1953[43]. The most relevant information seems to be that Klup-e Milli as a “political circle set up by Daud and Zabuli in the month of Jaddi 1325 (December 1946/January 1947) and allegedly financed by the latter”[44] According to Daud Momand, itself an hyperactive protagonist in the Pushtunist issues nowadays, the main founder of “Awaken Youth” was a military officer with the name Rasul Khan Pashtun[45], surprisingly, who was a “poet and not happy with the government”[46]. A second individual determining the affairs of the organization was called Gulam Hasan Safi, mostly responsible for Mashreqi and Kabul. What is intriguing in this blog of Mr Momand, is, that he has got a list of the founding members, list previous scientific research could not reveal. He reveals following names: “Rasul Pashtun, Hasan Safi, Ulfat, Shams Uldin Majroh, Shukur Reshad, Abdulhai Habibi, Faiz Mohammad Enkar, Arsalan Salimi, Aziz Khawari, Mussa Shafiq, Khadem, Naser Momand, Ibrahem Khwa Khujai, Agha Mohammad Karsei, Ghulam Mohammad Popal, Taher Safi, Sufi Wali Mohammad, Nek Mohammad Paktiahi, Mohammad Anwar Azekzai, Qazi Abdul Samad, Nur Mohammad Qazi Khel, Fateh Mohammad Khatgar, Sufi

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[42] Many sources. i.e. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Daoud_Khan.

[43] Lentz, HM (1994) Heads of States and Governments Since 1945. Routledge Also in Wikipedia, all related encyclopedias and corresponding scholarly references.

[44] Thomas Ruttig. AAN website. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/context-culture/flash-from-the-past-the-1950-kabul-students-union-and-its-impact-on-the-post-wwii-opposition-movement/ (Last access 12 April 2026)

[45]رسول خان پشتون, an army officier from Kandahar,

[46][46] Momand, D, (2020). The founder of the Wish Zalmian Movement. Online: http://www.arianafghanistan.com/UploadCenter/D_momand_rasool_pashtun_vish_zalmayaan.pdf last access 2 April 2026

Wali Moghammad, Ghulam Dstagir Popal, Reshtin, Khaleq Wasehi, Ali Hotak, Ahmad Shaker, Razaq Ferahi, Hasan Ridi, Khodai Dost Mohammad Khan, Mohammad Nur Alam, Zuhur Hamdard, Abdullah Safi, Mohammad Alam Basarki, Dr. Nur Ahmad Berizh, Samad Waissa, Glu Shah Sufi, Maihudin Zarmalwal, Wakli Nur Mohammad, Rafiq nasseri, Manan Dardmand, Dr. Abdul Rahman Mahmoudi, Hadi Bahar, Asef Pass Yusufi, Qasi Bahram Azekzai, Salam barekzai, Khodai Dost, Pir Mohammad Barekzai, Nur Mohammad Taraki“[47] The newspaper of the organisation was called: Angar. The author mentions further that “The only personality that the government of Sham Mahmoud could hinder to enter the national assembly, was the Pashtun leader of the country, Mohammad Gul Baba, the hero who saved the country.“ Daud Momand, the author of this blog, is a relative of Mohmmad Gul Momand, the real hero of *Afghans* in the 20 century.

The” Aryana data base”[48] states on the issue: “One of the first newspapers after the enactment of the Press Law was the non-governmental newspaper Angar (Azarakhsh), edited by Faiz Mohammad Angar, which was considered the interpreter of the Wheesh Zalmeyan (Awakened Youth) movement. This movement was established as a nationwide national organization in 1325 AH. Its main organizers were mostly enlightened Pashto-speaking representatives of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar, and many political and social figures of that era published their writings in Angar; people such as Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghabbar, a

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[47] ibid, Page 3. محمد رسول "**پښتون**" مشر حرکت، غالم حسن خان صافی، استاد **الفت**، سید شمس الدین **مجروح**، عالمه شکور عبدالحی **حبیبی**، فیض محمد انکار، ارسالن سلیمی، عبدالعزیز خاوری، موسی **شفیق**، استاد خادم، حاکم ناصر خان **مومند**، محمد ابرائیم خواخوړی، آ**غا محمد کرزی**، غالم محمد خان پوپل، محمد طاهر صافی، نیک محمد پکتیانی، محمد انور خان اخکزی، ی خیل، فتح محمد ختڼکر، صوفی ولی محمد، غالم دستگیر پوپل، استاد **رشتین**، عبدالخالق قاضی عبدلصمد، نور محمد قاض واسعی، محمد علی هوتک، نور احمد شاکر، عبدارزاق فراهی، محمد حسن ریدی، خدای دوست خان، محمد نور علم، ظهور د ویسا، گل شاه صافی، غالم محی الدین هلا همدرد، مولوی عبیدهللا صافی، محمد علم بخرکی، داکتر نوراحمد بریځ، عبدالصم زرملوال، وکیل نور محمد خان، محمد رفیق ناصری پسر نایب سالار غالم نبی خان ناصری، عبدالمنان دردمند، داکتر عبدالرحمن **محمودی**، عبدالهادی بحر، آصف پاس یوسفی، قاضی بحرام اخکزی، عبدالسالم بارکزی، حاجی خدای دوست، میرزا پیر محمد رکزی، ن**ور محمد تره کی** و

[48] Aryana database. https://database-aryana-encyclopaedia.blogspot.com/2009/08/blog-post_3270.html last access 16.4.2026

historian and a critical and left-wing figure and a passionate supporter of the "Awakened Youth Movement"; Abdul Rahman Mahmoudi, a radical left-wing political figure; Noor Mohammad Taraki, one of the founders and leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (and President of Afghanistan in 1357-1358); Ahmad Ali Kohzad, head of the History Society; and Abdul Rauf Binwa and Gul Pacha Ulfat, well-known Pashtun nationalist writers. In the beginning of an article in the Angar newspaper on March 1, 1329, the main goals of this group were announced as "serving the Afghan nation, fighting against the people's deceit, bullying, tyranny, exploitation, betrayal, bribery and superstitious customs and traditions."

In a declassified document of the US government from October 19 of 1954, it is stated that:" Chances for an improvement in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, now dominated by the Afghan-instigated Pushtunistan controversy, are poor. There has been some discussion in Pakistan and Afghan official circles of some form of union or confederation between the two countries. However, because of basic internal complications and almost certain Soviet and Indian opposition, it is extremely unlikely that such a merger will take place… The replacement of British power along Afghanistan's southeast flank by a weak nation of initially uncertain stability also encouraged a revival of Afghan interest in the territories and peoples it had previously lost to the British. Although Afghanistan has laid no formal claim to territory in what is now Pakistan, it has never fully accepted Pakistan's assumption of the old Durand Line as its boundary with Afghanistan and has demanded ever since Pakistan's establishment that the latter's approximately five million Pushtu-speaking Pathan tribesmen, originally part of what is still the dominant tribal group in Afghanistan, be given an autonomous state of their own, Pushtunistan. Afghanistan's original motives in sponsoring the Pushtunistan cause are still not completely clear, and its efforts to stir up support among the tribesmen themselves have had only limited success. However, Afghanistan has persisted in its campaign to the extent that by now the Pushtunistan issue has become an issue of national prestige with a momentum of its own. Although Afghanistan's demand for Pushtunistan is a major theme of its foreign policy, the proposal has never been exactly defined. Afghan propaganda varies widely in its treatment of the territorial extent of the proposed state and what its relations to Pakistan and Afghanistan should be. Pakistan refuses to discuss any question involving its territorial integrity. It takes the position, which is largely supported by the available evidence, that

Pakistan has succeeded to all British rights east of the Durand Line and that the Pathan tribes are satisfied with maintaining the same relation to Pakistan as they had with British India. The Pathan tribes themselves receive subsidies and inducements from one side or the other and, hence, though the tribes themselves are not particularly in favour of the Pushtunistan state, they have an interest in seeing the controversy continue. Various efforts by third parties, including the US in 1950, to bring about a settlement have foundered on the unwillingness of either side to recede from its basic position. Afghanistan refuses to enter formal negotiations with Pakistan over common problems unless Pushtunistan is on the agenda. Although some leading Afghans profess a desire to see the dispute closed, Prime Minister Daud is perhaps the most ardent advocate of Pushtunistan among the royal family. The tempo of propaganda from Kabul has been stepped up again in recent months. At jirgas (tribal assemblages), tribal leaders have been promised that the government will continue to seek the separate Pathan state, and the government-controlled Afghan press maintains a barrage of Pushtunistan propaganda. "[49] And it continues: "The chances for an improvement in Pakistan-Afghan relations, now dominated by the Pushtunistan controversy, are poor. Afghan agitation of the issue is likely to continue, particularly while Daud continues as prime minister."[50]

The party of Farhad became known as the Afghan Mellat (Afghan nation) according to its publication's name, while its members called it "Hezb-e Afghan Social Democrat" (Afghan Social Democratic Party). "The party followed a pro-Pashtunistan strategy for a "greater Afghanistan" (Dupree 1977: 611-612). However, what made the party more popular was its ethno-nationalistic strategy. Its members were mainly ultra conservative Pashtuns who were against the rights of any other ethnic groups. Particularly the party wanted the Pashtu language to be the only official language. An example of this was the hard debate on the

[49] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2. Document 905. INR–NIE files. Secret NIE–53–54. Washington, 19 October 1954. National Intelligence Estimate. Outlook for Afghanistan. Online: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d905 last access 3 April 2926

[50] ibid

constitution during the Loya Jirga of 1964, in which Farhad, the ASDP's its leader, raised his opposition against Farsi to be stipulated as the official language (FARHANG 1996: 721)."[51]

[51] Sardar M. Kohistani (2011) State-building in Afghanistan: The role of institutional capacity. Dissertation and er Universität Gießen. Online: https://www.khorasanzameen.net/php/en/pdf/sm-kohistani01.pdf

AN OVERT FASCIST GROUP SIMULATING "SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC" PARTY

Let's start with an analogy[52], to clarify the relation between concepts, context and content of Afghan Mellat group. One wonders why and how the German Nazi did[53] Party used the term "National Socialists". to unite nationalist and socialist movements after the First World War, defining their "socialism" in racist terms. It wasn't about classlessness, but rather a racist "people's community" that offered social benefits to "Aryan" Germans, while opponents were excluded and murdered. Here are the main reasons: People's community instead of class struggle: The "**social**"[54] aspect was understood as the unification of the "working masses," referring solely to the nation. It was an attempt to win over the working class. Strategic choice of name: The term "socialism" was popular in the Weimar Republic. The Nazis (like Gregor Strasser) used the term to lure workers away from left-wing parties. People's socialism: In contrast to Marxist socialism (internationalism, aiming a classless society in the future), the Nazis propagated a "German socialism.", a format of society only for ethnic Germans. The "**social**" aspect applied only to ethnically defined Germans. Those who didn't belong (Jews, all minorities) were marginalized, robbed, and murdered. The Nazis used the term to make **social** promises (job creation, "Strength Through Joy") that were intended to promote corruption and loyalty to the dictatorship.

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[52] An analogy is the correspondence or similarity of relationships, structures, or functions between two **different** areas. It serves as a comparison **to clarify complex issues through known connections**, to strengthen arguments, or to draw conclusions from similarities.

[53] "Nazi" is short for "National Socialist" and refers to members and supporters of the NSDAP (1920–1945) or people who support its bloody ideology. This worldview is based on racism, antisemitism, ultranationalism, the Führer principle, and the rejection of liberal democracy. They were responsible for the Holocaust and for the Second World War and. Originally, it was used by opponents – inspired by the term "Sozi" for Social Democrats – as a derogatory term, since "Nazi" in the Bavarian dialect was a diminutive form of Ignaz, which in turn was often used as a synonym for a clumsy person. The Nazi Party later partially adopted the term itself, as Joseph Goebbels' publication "Der Nazi-Sozi" (1926) shows.

[54] Jacobin Magazin, 07. Februar 2022. Online in German https://jacobin.de/artikel/nein-die-nazis-waren-keine-sozialisten-geschichtsrevisionismus-nationalsozialismus-hufeisentheorie-historikerstreit . Neue Zürcher zeitung, 15.02.2022, https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/historiker-simms-die-nazis-sahen-sich-selbst-als-sozialisten-ld.1669622 last access 1 April 2026. Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, Februar 2025 (zuletzt geändert Februar 2026). https://www.politische-bildung-brandenburg.de/lexikon/nazi

Afghan Mellat, an overt fascist group, has been, by ideological orientation, an *Afghan* ethno-nationalist group. Ethnonationalists sometimes refer to themselves as "social democrats" or "socialists," or use leftist symbolism to pursue strategic goals that differ significantly from traditional left-wing social democracy. This occurs primarily for the following reasons: Redefinition of socialism: Ethno-nationalists often attempt to reinterpret "socialism" from a class-based (internationalist, beyond nation-state, beyond nation) ideology into an ethnic, thus, racial, and national idea. The focus is not on the liberation of the working class, but on the "**national community**[55]" in which the individual is subordinated to the collective interests of the ethnic group. Th

We cited extensively the current program of Afghan Mellat in previous chapters. They use exactly the word "**national community**" in their program, that has been online since long time till today. By using **social** terminology, right-wing groups attempt to appeal to traditionally left-wing or social-democratic voters and exploit economic discontent for their own purposes. Afghan Neo-Nazis and right-wingers use left-wing symbolism (e.g., keffiyehs, Che Guevara T-shirts) and terminology to gain wider **social** acceptance and blur the lines between left and right (so-called "autonomous nationalists"). Ethnonationalists instrumentalize social-democratic concepts to make a nationalist ideology more attractive. So is doing the **Afghan ethnonationalist group** Afghan Mellat, still today.

The group founder Farhad, the Germany educated politician, having studied between 1921 und 1928 in München, the epicentre of German Hitlerian fascism, and the man who studied in 1939, following the order of the country regent Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai, at the "Hohe Schule" of "Außenpolitisches Amt" of Alfred Rosenberg, the elite school for fascistic education and Nazi propaganda, had decided to brand a right wing extremist ethnonationalist group as an "social democrat party"[56], a wording which normally will be associated as a leftist movement.

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[55] See previous documentation in this essay, especially the extraction from the program of Afghan Mellat. They use exactly the word "national community" in their program, that has been online since long time till today.

[56] See previous documentation in this essay in regard to the website of the Afghan fascist group.

This manipulative act of lying, distortion, deformation and defiance and a willingness to use violence, exerted by Afghan ethnonationalist group Afghan Mellat, seems in the light of this re-branding a real right-wing extremist ethnonationalist group to a, virtually, leftist phenomenon. This act of emulation a "social" and a "democratic" group, while overtly being a fascist group, is a real master work of fascist manipulation of grand scale. The group founder Farhad, connected even to "The Socialist International (SI)" that is a political international consisting mostly of social democratic political parties and labour organisations. The SI was founded in support of democratic socialism, albeit it has generally moderated over time.

Farhad, a real magician, achieved to manipulate the Socialist International, as easy as he could manipulate a generation of young and naive *Afghans* and all other people in Afghanistan.

THE CURRENT LEADER AHADI AND THE "MONEY MAN" FOR THE TALEBAN MILITIA

The current leader of Afghan Mellat has been Anwar Ulhaq Ahadi. Professionally, he is currently a on the Board of Trustees of the Fund for the Afghan People (the Swiss-based "**Afghan** Fund"). Since the Taliban takeover, Ahady has emulated, allegedly, a technocrat, contributing to international discussions on the Afghan economy and discussing some aspects of the current **Afghan** Taleban militia administration's handling of the economy, but not acting through the platform of Afghan Mellat. Why? Because the reputation of Afghan Mellat as a fascist group arrived after long times in Europe, therefor it is impossible to act in this function. Mr Ahadi is faking evidently "professional economic consultancy" within the Swiss-based "Afghan Fund" to stabilize Taleban militia's structures and functioning, based on his identical and substantially similar ideology of Pushtunism[57]. The website of the Afghan Mellat writes the following about its leader that is 1995 in this function: "Dr. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady is the president of the Afghan Social Democratic Party (also known as the Afghan Mellat Party). Dr. Ahady received a USAID scholarship to complete his undergraduate studies in political

[57] Brundage, G (2026) US Promotion of Afghan Pashtun Ethnonationalism. A new and deadlier phase of American forever wars intensifies in Afghanistan and the Central Asian Region. ANA. https://www.academia.edu/49052091/Ethnonationalism_and_Terrorism_in_Afghanistan last access 12 April 2026. (The year of publication could not be found, therefor the year 2026.

Kartal, RN (2020) Problem of Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Afghanistan: A Panorama of Pashtunisation Politics. Al-Farabi International Journal on Social Sciences.

https://www.academia.edu/63333587/Problem_of_Ethnicity_Religion_and_Politics_in_Afghanistan_A_Panorama_of_Pashtunisation_Politics. last access 12 April 2026. See also Abdulloev, R (2013) Pashtuns in Afghanistan's political landscape. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS. Volume 14 Issue 3. Lieven, A (2021) An Afghan Tragedy: The Pashtuns, the Taliban and the State. Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 3. Tainter, JA (2011) Cultural perception and segmentary lineage organization. Understanding and Working Within Pashtun Society. Publication of Office of Naval Research, Human Social Cultural Behavioral Program. Dawar, AI (2019) Transnational Ideologies, Violent Conflict, and Pashtun Social Identity. Asian Institute of Research, Journal Publication, Journal Academics, Education Journal, Asian Institute. Journal of Social and Political Sciences. ISSN 2615-3718 (Online). Sheikh, SR (2019) Pashtun Nationalism: Politics and Talibanization. Pakistan Horizon. Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2016), pp. 71-86 (16 pages). January 10, 2019. Ayoob, M (2019) The Taliban and the Changing Nature of Pashtun Nationalism. The National Interest. January 10, 2019. Rehman Khan, A (2025) Pashtun Nationalism and Cross-Border Politics: A Historical and Political Study of the Durand Line Disputes. The Journal of Research Review. P-ISSN: 3006-2632 E-ISSN: 3006-2640Vol. 2. No. 02 (April-June) 2025. Ibrahimi, N (2023) A Violent Nexus: Ethnonationalism, Religious. The Review of Faith & International Affairs. Volume 21, 2023. Taylor & Francis Online. Schetter, C. (2022). Who are 'the' Taliban? Life Worlds between Pashtun Traditions, Islamism, and Globalisation. EthnoScripts: Zeitschrift für aktuelle ethnologische Studien, 24(1), 62-80. Ghufran, N (2009) Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Asian Survey November 2009 49(6):1092-1114. University of California Press. Saikal, A (2010) Afghanistan and Pakistan: The question of pashtun nationalism? Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. Volume30. Issue number 1.

science and economics at the American University of Beirut. Dr. Ahady obtained his BA (with distinction) in 1974 and his MA (in international relations) in 1977 from the American University of Beirut. Dr. Ahady received a scholarship from the Northwestern University in Chicago to complete his Ph.D. studies in political science. From Northwestern, Dr. Ahady obtained his M.BA in finance and international economics in 1983 and his Ph.D. in political science in 1984. Dr. Ahady taught political science at Carleton College in Minnesota for one year and worked for Continental Bank in Chicago for two years. In 1987, Dr. Ahady joined the Department of Political Science at Providence College, Rhode Island. Currently, at Providence College, Dr. Ahady is a tenured full professor of political science.

Dr. Ahady was attracted to the Afghan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat) in 1969. Since then, he has been an activist. Dr. Ahady was elected, by the Party Congress, to the Supreme Council of the Afghan Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat) in 1987 and 1990. And in 1995, the Party Congress elected Dr. Ahady as the president of the Afghan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat). Dr. Ahady still serves the party in this capacity. Factually, Mr. Ahadi, the "economist", is emulating, allegedly, since a decade an impartial technocrat, as did the classic *Afghan* fascist Farhad, the engineer, in his time as the mayor of Kabul wo was selected by the royal family Mosaheban's senior powerful man Hashem Mohammadzai Barekzai (ruling with an iron hand 1933-1953) in this function.

Afghan Fund[58] was, according to the institution's own explanation, "was established in September 2022 as a not-for-profit foundation in Geneva, Switzerland to protect, preserve, and—on a targeted basis—disburse its assets for the benefit of the Afghan people. These disbursements are intended to help address the acute effects of Afghanistan's humanitarian and economic crises by supporting Afghanistan's macroeconomic and financial stability, thereby benefiting the Afghan people. The funds set aside for the Afghan Fund initially constituted USD 3.5 billion in Afghan central bank reserves, and as of December 2024 its assets have surpassed USD 3.9 billion with investment earnings. The Fund is staffed by an Executive Secretary, who reports to the Board, executes the Board's decisions, and coordinates the

[58] Website https://afghanfund.ch/ last access 17.4.2026

Fund's activities on behalf of the Board. "[59] Interestingly, the last meeting of the board took place on June 11th, 2025. This last meeting was chaired jointly by Dr. Anwar ul-Haq Ahady and Dr. Shah Mohammed Mehrabi. „During the meeting, the Board approved the Afghan Fund's audited financial statements for the year 2024. The Board indicatively planned to hold its next meeting in fall 2025. The report of this institution's meeting, with those purposes and aims, mentioned, above, contains less than 100 words, very "brief and compressed".[60] Two issues seem at first glance, allegedly, intriguing. The role and function of Dr. Shah Mohammed Mehrabi, a fellow Afghan (Pushtun) businessman and multi talent [61], allegedly, with connections with the Afghan ethnonationalist scene. Surprisingly. And the second theme would be mode of management and the ways of managing cash influx into the Taleban Afghanistan. In printemps 2025, A US-congress report stated that "as of March 31, the fund's assets with accrued interest earnings had reached $3.792 billion, which constitutes the total funding available to the fund for potential future disbursements."[62] In fall 2025 the fund's assets with accrued interest earnings „reached $3.981 billion.[63]" Mr Ahadi, allegedly, has got close relationships with the Taleban leadership. In the mean times, merely emulating a technocrat seems not enough for Mr. Ahadi. He switched the modus operandi. "Dr. Anwar al-Haq Ahadi's interview with Amu TV, an Afghan international satellite channel, has sparked widespread reaction and debate. In the interview, Dr. Ahadi addressed issues of ethnic and national identity, presenting a perspective grounded in the argument that, globally, many

[59] ibid

[60] Report source https://afghanfund.ch/files/2025-06-30_press-statement-2025-06-11.pdf last access 17.4.2026

[61] Institutions's website „Dr. Mehrabi is currently employed as Professor of Economics at Montgomery College in Maryland. Dr. Mehrabi holds a bachelor's degree in economics from California Polytechnic University, a master's degree in economics from the University of Cincinnati, and a doctorate degree in Economics and Education from the University of Cincinnati. Dr. Mehrabi has extensive professional experience working on matters related to the economy and central bank of Afghanistan. He is currently a member of the Supreme Council of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) and has served several previous terms since 2002. In addition, Dr. Mehrabi has served as senior economic advisor to Afghanistan's previous ministers of finance."

[62] Report to Congress on Proposed Uses of the Afghan Fund Section 7019(e) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (Div. F, P.L. 118-47) and Senate Report 118-71 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Report-Proposed-Uses-of-the-Afghan-Fund-006158-508-Accessible-HRC1161348.pdf last access 17.4.2026

[63] Congress report to Fall 2025 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Report-to-Congress-on-Proposed-Uses-of-the-Afghan-Fund-Accessible-11.20.2025.pdf last access 17.4.2026

nation-states derive their national identity from the ethnic, tribal, or founding group that established them. From this standpoint, he concludes that Afghanistan's national identity should be defined as either "Afghani" or "Pashtun." "[64] so, the report of Hasht-e Subh, the most read virtual newspaper of the country. It adds: „Dr. Ahadi's statements, however, directly threaten this delicate social fabric, exacerbating collective grief and sorrow. It can be said with confidence that his rhetoric, while expressed in calm language, insults the principle of coexistence and risks fueling animosity, hostility, and social discord. In doing so, Dr. Ahadi disrespects nearly forty million Afghan citizens, inflicting a wound that, although articulated softly, scorches the roots of a nation already suffering under the harsh sun of prejudice. "[65] The story of Mr. Ahadi worsens, allegedly, in 2026. Hasht e Subh writes again on 31 January 2026 "excluding Persian neither enhances the Taliban's legitimacy, improves governance, nor strengthens social solidarity. On the contrary, each act of erasure sparks waves of protest, weakens unity, and pushes society toward dangerous polarization, pitting Persian speakers against Pashto speakers. The Taliban are fully aware of these consequences. Yet they continue their policy of exclusion because their goal is the consolidation of linguistic hegemony. When the objective is to establish and maintain ethno-linguistic dominance, policymakers of this sort are indifferent to the social costs. Indeed, Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, the former leader of the Afghan Millat Party and a staunch advocate of linguistic hegemony, explicitly emphasized in a recent interview that Pashto must remain dominant over all other languages, particularly Persian, under any circumstances, even at the cost of increasing social discontent and undermining what is termed "national unity." Ahadi and the Taliban share a common objective: the consolidation of linguistic supremacy. The difference lies in method: Ahadi advances his agenda with subtlety and ostensibly democratic rhetoric, while the Taliban employs beards, traditional garb, and Islamic slogans. " [66] For the sake of the Afghan hegemony, Mr. Ahadi, allegedly, attempts to educate Taleban to be less restrictive in some

[64] Hasht e Subh 28 January 2026. Online: https://8am.media/eng/dr-ahadi-and-driving-the-final-nail-into-afghanistans-coffin/ last access 17.4.2026

[65] ibid

[66] Hasht e Subh, 31 January 2026, https://8am.media/eng/the-talibans-war-on-persian-when-the-language-cannot-coexist-with-pashto-and-english/ last access 17.4.2026

areas. “Afghanistan International”, the most viewed and well financed TV/You tube channel writes “Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, a former finance minister, says the conditions necessary to attract investment do not exist under Taliban rule, citing insecurity, the absence of a legal framework and the dominance of clerics over state institutions.“[67] As a well-educated *Afghan* ethnonationalist in the West, related with the religious group of Gilani[68] by his marriage with his daughter Fatana Gilani, he merely attempts to consult the extremist religious *Afghan* ethnonationalist Taleban to be open to his economic ideas and initiatives. The violence, the offensiveness, the aggression and the dehumanization of Taleban against the on-Afghans in the country seem, allegedly, not bother him at all. “Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi, a former Afghan finance minister, told Afghanistan International that Afghanistan could use the Iran route and the Lapis Lazuli Corridor as long-term alternatives for exports and imports. “[69] Factually he acts, allegedly, as the real finance minister of Taleban. He is, allegedly, totally involved in all affaires of Taleban governance by the merit of the common Pushtunism ideology.

And there is evident that Ahadi, allegedly, emulating a finance consultant and “impartial” technocrat. Regarding the last two decades, he was collaborating with different religious fundamentalist groups. “Politically, the most active of the tanzim is NIFA. Driven by the two sons of Pir Gailani, in alliance with Afghan Millat, led by the Pir’s son-in-law, Finance Minister Ahady, it managed to successfully build a pro-Karzai coalition amongst the Pashtuns including radical Islamists from Dawat-e Islami and the legalized domestic wing of Hezb-e Islami (see next paragraph). Meanwhile, NIFA tries to present a moderate Islamic front, somewhat different from the other tanzim. The defeat of deputy leader Hamed Gailani in the 2005 elections in Paktika showed, however, that the party has weaknesses even in their claimed areas of influence.118 Mojaddedi’s ANLF, always the weakest of the seven tanzim, largely remained a one-man show and without much effect as a party.”[70] And also “This link already

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[67] Afghanistan International. Facebook site: https://www.facebook.com/afintlen/photos/anwar-ul-haq-ahadi-a-former-finance-minister-says-the-conditions-necessary-to-at/955694006782150/ last access 17.4.2026

[68] Ralph H. Magnus, Eden Naby (2002) Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid. Westview. In this study the relationship to the Islamist religious was referring the Aghan Mellat in 1980s. page 126.

[69] Afghanistan International on Nov 13, 2025. Online: https://www.afintl.com/en/202511132536 last access 17.4.2026

[70] Ruttig, Th (2012) Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006). With references to “Abdulhamid Mubarez, Tahlil-e waqe’at.e siasi-ye Afghanistan 1919-1996, Kabul, 1996”. Online:

existed during the Jihad when Afghan Millat was only allowed to operate in Pakistan under the NIFA umbrella. See: Kakar, op. cit., p. 104. Ahady also was member of the Pir's delegation (the Peshawar group) at the Bonn Conference." The role of Afghan Mellat and its leader during the two decades of Western military presence has not been a topos of this article, but it was a transparent modus operandi, without any doubt an Afghan openly Pushtunist ethnonationalist stance. Specifically, to the period after 2001 Ruttig reported that "Amongst the **ethno-nationalists**, Afghan Millat has profoundly thrown in its lot with the government and is a major player in the Pashtun camp. With its leader Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady as a government minister and a group of some 10 MPs, the party is well-positioned and has access to resources. A network of NGOs close to it helps to mobilise support in the provinces, not only in **Pashtun areas**. Still predominantly Pashtun, it is trying to shed its old Pashtunist image and is making efforts to mobilize among other ethnic groups. Two other factions, led by Shams-ul-Huda Shams (d. Dec. 2005; he is followed by his son Eng. Ajmal Shams as party leader144) and by Qudratullah Haddad, have become marginalised. "[71] This Afghan Pushtunist ethnonationalist stance of Ahadi and his group exerted a rational policy of adaptive action during the period of Western military presence 2001-2021. He knew very well how to adapt his idiom, jargon and his expressions according to the individuals, groups or media he was talking. And today in 2026 the method is unchanged and almost identical. Toward Westerners, e.g. in the presence of human right NGOs, many the "humanitarian industry" and specifically good earning NGOs staff that had been present between 2005 and 2021 in the country. His modus operandi and tactical approach were adaptive, thus well thought and calculated. I.g. with the NGOs, with mostly liberal or left leaning Western personnel, he was straight ahead "fully democratic" sometimes neoliberal neutral, sometimes neoconservative right-wing, calm and smooth, without any nationalist or rather ethnonationalist rhetorics. Just a technocrat with manners and tight cravats. With the EU or US regular politicians, less left liberal than NGO staff, he was (is today still) again "democratic", some well-placed microdosed nationalist but still tolerable and no ethnonationalist rhetorics. With the US military and EU politicians, not

https://web.archive.org/web/20090327080958/http://www.acsf.af/English/articles/KAS%20pol%20parties%20paper.pdf (Last access 5 April 2026). Page 22

[71] Ruttig, Th (2012) Page 28.

liberal at all, thorough nationalist and few well-placed Pushtunist ethnonationalist rhetorics. In academic circles, he appears explicitly as a boring and bored technocrat with a weak past academic track.[72] His idiom, jargon and his expressions in communicative situations to the individuals, groups or media from and in Afghanistan, he was less adaptive than toward Westerners but still differentiating in what circle he was talking. Today this habitus changed a small nuance. He would have had still something to lose. While Ahadi has been trained in a US university in American Beirut till 1974[73] he had learned to control his temper, better than his predecessor Ghulam Farhad who always was convinced from his metaphysical Pushtunist supremacist mission till 1978. In Beirut, he earned a bachelor's degree as well as a master's degree in economics and political science. Ahadi realised after emigrating to the US after 1974 a smooth, academically low-level career in a low-intensity provincial US-universities. Ahady holds a Master of Business Administration (MBA) and a Ph.D. in political science from the post-graduate faculty of Northwestern University. [74] served as an assistant professor of political science at Carleton College, in Northfield, Minnesota, in the United States, and as the banking director of Continental Elona of Chicago from 1985 to 1987. He was a professor of political science at the Catholic university from 1987 to 2002. In this period, he converted to an academic activist in the realm of nativistic Pushtunism ideology and "*Afghan* ethnonationalism". The American province seemed to be a fertile soil. The most preeminent supremacist action of Ahadi took place in 1995, provided as a harmless presentation and covered academic paper. He wrote a manifesto of Pushtunism that achieved a high popularity in the Pushtun supremacist circles in the US, in Pakistan and later with some incubation time in the country. In the horizon of Taleban invasion 1995, Ahadi offered the theoretical framework in a presentation/text named the decline of Pashtuns. The text[75] available is the

[72] Exploratory research of his interviews, talks, meeting speeches, group or individual encounters with folks from Afghanistan I know personally, revealed and confirmed the notion. Always calm, smooth, well-dressed, and "rational".

[73]Multiple sources. i.g. Afghanistan Journalistic Network https://www.afghanpaper.com/info/saran%20siasi/ahadi.htm. Wikipedia (in all related languages). His former employer Northwestern University in the US https://www.northwestern.edu/magazine/northwestern/fall2003/features/ahady/index.htm.

[74] Mr Ahadi goes to Kabul https://www.northwestern.edu/magazine/northwestern/fall2003/features/ahady/index.htm (Last access 19 April 2026)

[75] Ahadi AA, (1995) The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Asian Survey (1995) 35 (7): 621–634.

transcript of a speech at some conference. The author, freshly chosen as the new leader of the Afghan fascist group Afghan Mellat and still incognito in the US emulating a "harmless" academician giving "harmless"[76] speeches at scholarly conferences, argues that the 1992 collapse of the "Najib regime" marked the end of traditional Pashtun dominance in *Afghan* politics. It is intriguing that Ahadi, a right-wing US-neoconservative turned to an *Afghan* Pushtunist ethnonationalist in 1990s, was well accustomed and juxtaposed with Najib, an inflammatory pro-soviet communist in his youth and a martial communist regime intelligence chief 1981-1986. Oriented on Najib's slow turn to Afghan ethnonationalism after 1986, after all Najib was the son of a tribal local matador and military of Mashreqi province Akhtar Mohammad Khan with a country wide reputation in ethnonationalist behaviour, Ahady understood the dynamics of Pushtun power very well. He states in this article that structural changes, ethnic polarization, and the rise of other groups diminished Pushtun control, making future Pushtun political power exertion "difficult". Ahadi understood that even the Najib's pro-soviet communist regime had been in favour of the continuity of the traditional Afghan tribal dominance in economy and administration, in military and policing, in education and jurisprudence. The fall of the Soviet-backed Najib regime in 1992 signifies a possible definitive end of nearly two centuries of Pashtun dominance in Afghan tribal politics. That scares Ahadi more than anything else. The loss of power derived economic and political privileges seems to be from this time on the main driver of apolitical actions of Ahadi in times to come, till today in 2026. Ahady argues that the 1978 communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion destroyed the traditional mechanism where Pashtuns maintained power, leading to intensified ethnic identification among non-Pashtuns (Ösbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras). While reading the text, one becomes attentive to the fact that the real addressee of this first *manifesto*[77] of Afghan ethnonationalism, written in a US academic institution, is not the

https://doi.org/10.2307/2645419

[76] The notion of „emulating a harmless person/group" belongs from the beginning to the structure of the fascist group Afghan Mellat, inside the group talks and acts overtly as a fascist group, to the Europeans, es especially in Germany, it emulates a "social democratic party" for funds and options.

[77] A manifesto is a public declaration of intentions, motives, or views, issued by an individual, group, political party, or government. It outlines beliefs, critiques the status quo, and proposes specific actions or policies to bring about change

institution but the *Afghan* intelligentsia inside and outside country. The paper suggests that shared religion failed to bridge ethnic divides, as ethnic identity proved more powerful than Islamic identity during the resistance against the communists. One might read between the lines notion. Ahadi, who, evidently, wrote letters to his fellow Afghan ethnonationalist Najib, the former pro-soviet communist and soviet KGB educated chief of intelligence turned, evidently, an ethno-fascist, know well to whom he is writing on “ethnic identity”. The power vacuum, particularly in the early 1990s, was filled by strong non-Pashtun factions, causing a permanent shift in Afghanistan’s political landscape. I recall again, the notions of fascism in those definitions quoted earlier in this article. The angst of decline one’s ethnic entity is the most powerful driver of fascism. Ahady concludes that because of this "decline," it would be almost “impossible” for Pashtuns to restore the same level of political dominance they enjoyed in the past, leading to a more competitive or fragmented political reality.

The manifesto was heard and read, a non-academic, irredentist and simplified version of the text was sent around the world to Afghan exile literati, and it was sent specifically to the leaders of Taleban in Kandahar in printemps 1996. Taleban would have prepared themselves at this time for the large and obviously last invasion toward Kabul. The capital was invaded in September 1996. Anything Ahadi was afraid of, namely the loss of Afghan control had been prevented. The Afghan tribe again, won a battle for the continuation of power in Afghan-Stan. In the years to come Ahadi had been emphasizing many times[78] that his clear and warning message, hence the first “*Manifesto of Pushtunism*” arrived well and effectively.

[78] Personal communication with the author by people working at the ministry of finance (2004-2009), ministry of Commerce and Industry (2010-2013) and agriculture till August 2021. The statements were expressed in smaller circles, mostly encompassing solely Afghan co-workers of these ministries, and, as it happens, occasionally leaked to the non-Afghan co-workers. Ahadi showed within the circle of “Beiruti Boys”", a group of **Afghan** literati educated at the American University of Beirut who held significant positions in post-2001 regimes of Karazi and significantly of Asharf Ghani, one of the peer group. The relationship between Ghani and Ahadi worsens during the times between 1905 and 1914, because of high competition between the two essentially and habitually tribal men, in spite of their enormous efforts first to be “good Americans”, adapting their selves to the US academia ecology, and later to be “good tribal men” for the tribe’s case and power, both coming from insignificant Afghan families , without any relations to the centers of power in Kabul before 2001.

Ahadi wrote then a second *"Manifesto of Pushtunism"* in 1998 with the title "Second Saqawi"[79], co-authored, *allegedly* with Gharzai Layeq (son of the pro-soviet communist politician Soleiman Layeq, close friend of Najib, normally in European exile, but currently counselling Taleban 2.0 in education issues) and Ismail Yun (an openly right wing, ultraconservative Pushtun ethnonationalist in Kabul, currently counselling Taleban 2.0 in education issues) under the collective pseudonym of "Samsor Afghan". The second manifesto contains in 170 pages an accumulation of hatred, lies, detestation, distortion and defiance formulated against all non-Afghans of the country that is called Afghan-Stan and, of course, for the continuation of Afghan power. The manifesto has been, according to the introduction arranged and published in original Afghani (Pushtu) in Köln Germany. Köln is the European epicentre of Afghan Pushtunist extremism and extremists' ethnonationalist groups[80]. In 2023 a high ranked Taleban officer Abdelbari Omar, appeared, not surprisingly but cordially saluted and praised by *Afghan* youth and old men (In Pushtun meetings never finding any woman, it is against Pushtun code of honour), in an event arranged by the Afghan Pushtunist extremist group[81]. The manifesto itself has got minor academic significance, because it is a low-intensity narrative, vulgar language, weak in theory, weightless writing, but it is written with an intensive and provocative anti-Persian sentiment with emphasis on Pushtu language that seems to be, according to the author collective, in decline. One remembers again the definitions of fascism in previous chapters.

Recently, Ahadi started a genuine ethnonationalist campaign again in the exile media that is, one more time, targeting all efforts of non-Afghans, thus most Afghanistan's inhabitants and exiled migrants, to reconstitute their identity. This time, Ahadi seems to be one more time in his Pushtunism manifesto mood.

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[79] The Persian translation of the second Pushtnism manifesto is available on Ghofran Badakhshani's website. https://www.badakhshani.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85.pdf Last access 22.4.2026

[80] E.g. the explicitly extremist Pushtunist group د افغانستان کلتوری ودی تولنه . Corresponding extremist group websites https://www.benawa.com/details.php?id=3256 last access 21 April 2026. Afghanischer Kulturverein Köln Meschenich e. V., Kulturverein der Kunar Jugendlichen e.V..

[81] The corresponding news. https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/politik-ausland/wie-kam-der-denn-hier-rein-taliban-propagieren-mitten-in-deutschland-86132910.bild.html last access 21 April 2026

The first action in his “ethnonationalism 2026” campaign was an interview with the TV network AMU TV[82]. The program, occurring 25 January 2026, was called “Encounter with History. What is Afghan nationalism and what is its plan for Afghanistan? | Interview with Anwarul Haq Ahadi, former leader of the Afghan National Party” the interviewer was Mr Sami Mehdi from Amu TV[83]. Fortunately, due to the digital technology, you could rad the whole transcript of the interview and follow it minute per minute. Two aspects of this interview are intriguing, first the calmness of Ahadi while saying the unsayable ethnonationalist expressions and the overtly fascist idiom, and secondly it is, again a clear and transparent message to the Afghans, thus Pushtuns. In my opinion this the start of the campaign for the Afghanistan president’s position either after Taleban or with Taleban. The newspaper Asht e Subh wrote on 27 January 2026: “Dr. Anwarul Haq Ahadi’s interview with one of Afghanistan’s foreign television channels, Amo TV, has sparked widespread reactions and noise. In this interview, Dr. Ahadi addressed the issue of ethnic and national identity and presented views based on which, in the global experience, one can find many national states whose national identity is derived from the identity of the lineage, tribe, or group that founded that state. On this basis, he concludes that the national identity of Afghanistan should be “Afghan” or “Pashtun.”

While Ahadi is campaigning in Europe to make Taleban great again, the most notorious Afghan ethnonationalists of his group work for Taleban and appear regularly in the local media[84], to fulfil the mystic duty of being a real Pushtun.

[82] “Amu TV is an independent and impartial multimedia channel owned and operated by journalists, aimed at contributing to credibility, objectivity and creativity of Afghanistan’s journalism.”

[83] Amu Tv YouTube Channel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-cpuvgSm-0 last access 21 April 2026

[84] More that 22 appearances, I have witnessed in YouTube, of Aghan Mellat members since August 2021, always legitimizing Talebans violence and oppression. The systematic nature to act as the media enhancers of the Taleban militia, seems well defined and a consensus.

CONCLUSION

The overtly fascist group **Afghan** Mellat, exerting a Hollywood-reedy camouflage of emulation calling itself the “social democratic party of Afghanistan”, is an intriguing phenomenon. Founded by a full **Afghan** Nazi, Ghulam Mohammad Farhad, in 1966, is this group, 60 years later, still active and had infiltrated successfully the **Afghan** ethnonationalist militia Taleban in the land, and it permeated the Afghan (thus Pushtun) intelligentsia in the West. The later subgroup seems to be infected by an hypervirus of reactionary **Afghan** ethnonationalism, worse than ever. The underlying ideology of Pushtunism builds the common cognitive fundamental of **Afghan** ethnonationalist militia Taleban as well the ethnonationalist **Afghan** literati inside and outside the country. The leader of Afghan Mellat, Mr A. Ahadi, seems, allegedly, to act as the “money man” for Taleban, bypassing international hindrances and sanctions, and managing cash influx into Taleban land. And he is doing that not because he loves them, but the Pushtunism[85] ideology, the main driver for the will to power and hegemony, binds obviously them irreversibly.

The fascism[86] binding Afghan Taleban, and their extremist ethnic primitiveness, inside the country with the ethnonationalist Afghan educated class in the West is offensive, aggressive and dehumanizing. And as in printemps 2026, there is no way out of this unbearable catastrophe.

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[85] The ideology of "Pushtunism," as defined by Dr. Harun Badakhshi, served as the foundational doctrine for the ruling Mosaheban family (1929–1978)—a Mohammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe. This ideology propagated the "supremacy of the Pushtun ruler" as a "natural right," asserting a narrative of inherent superiority within Afghanistan’s multiethnic landscape, even though Pushtuns remained a demographic minority. Pushtunism provided the legal and moral framework to consolidate absolute power within the Mosaheban dynasty, granting them unchecked control over the economy, military, education, and state administration. Beyond the monarchy, it institutionalized "Pushtun privilege" for tribal leaders and the affluent urban class, ensuring that top-tier positions in the police, ministries, embassies, and banks were reserved for privileged Pushtun individuals. Critically, this ideological structure survived the fall of the Mosaheban rule in April 1978. It persisted—and was arguably enhanced—under subsequent "communist" leaders, including Noor Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, and Mohammad Najibullah, all of whom were ethnic Pushtuns. Following the 1996 rise of the Taliban (1.0), which ended the brief tenure of Rabbani (the sole non-Pushtun exception), the standard of Pushtun leadership was maintained through the U.S. intervention under Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. With the return of the Taliban (2.0) in August 2021, this ideological continuity remains the dominant political force in Afghanistan as of April 2027.

[86] See the extensive explanations in prior chapters

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